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The paper presents a theoretical analysis of the macroeconomic e¤ects
of active labour market programmes in a dual labour-market framework.
The paper uses the Shapiro-Stiglitz e¢ciency-wage model. Active labour
market programmes train unskilled labour and transfer them from a high-
unemployment to a low-unemployment sector. Programmes have a direct
labour-transfer e¤ect which tends to reduce total unemployment. They
also have e¤ects on wages via expectations. The latter e¤ects were to a
very large extent neglected in earlier discussions of active labour-market
policy. The model formally identi…es and de…nes the e¤ects on wages via
expectations. The net sign of the latter e¤ects depend on how programmes
are targeted. In general, the net e¤ect on unemployment is ambiguous.
The model explains the conditions under which active labour market pro-
grammes reduce aggregate unemployment.
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Recently, the interest in active labour market programmes (henceforth denoted
ALMPs) as a means of improving the functioning of the labour market has been
growing in Western Europe. The current high levels of persistent unemployment
seem likely to have an important structural component that cannot be handled
by demand policies only. ALMPs are often seen as a measure that can help
to reduce equilibrium unemployment by making labour markets more ‡exible
(OECD, 1994).
ALMPs are usually de…ned as measures to improve the functioning of the
labour market that are targeted on the unemployed and then primarily on un-
skilled workers. ALMPs can be seen to have three di¤erent roles: (1) a job broker-
age role; (2) a training/educational role; and (3) a job creation role (OECD, 1993;
Calmfors, 1994). Through these roles, ALMPs may in‡uence the labour market
in many di¤erent respects: resource allocation, income distribution and business
cycle stabilisation. In its resource allocation aspects, ALMPs make it easier to
match job-seekers with vacancies. In its income distribution aspects, ALMPs se-
cure incomes for the unemployed and provide employment for disabled workers.
In its stabilising role, ALMPs are implemented in such a way as to counter the
‡uctuations of the business cycle. In recent years, ALMPs have more and more
come to be seen as a way of preventing unemployed workers from dropping out
of the labour force, so that the e¤ective aggregate labour supply is maintained
(Layard et al., 1991).
In this paper, I focus on the training/education role of ALMPs and investigate
the impact of ALMPs in its re-allocation aspects. ALMPs can serve to re-allocate
labour from sectors with low productivity to sectors with high productivity. This
was the original motivation when ALMPs were adopted in both Sweden and the
US in the 1950s and 1960s. In Sweden, labour-market policies, such as labour-
market training and mobility grants, were suggested by the economists Gösta
Rehn and Rudolf Meidner in the 1950s (Fackföreningsrörelsen och den fulla sys-
selsättningen, 1951). The Rehn-Meidner model had a dominating in‡uence on
Swedish labour-market policy at least up to the end of the 1980s. This aspect
of ALMPs seems now again to be receiving increasing attention internationally
(Jackman 1994; OECD 1994).
When ALMPs train unskilled workers and increase labour mobility from low-
productivity sectors with high unemployment to high-productivity sectors with
low unemployment, ALMPs have a direct labour-placement e¤ect which tends to
2reduce aggregate unemployment. However, they may also have wage e¤ects be-
cause the incentives to set wages so that unemployment is held down are a¤ected.
These e¤ects were neglected in earlier discussions of active labour-market policy.
Holmlund and Lindén (1993) studied the e¤ects of temporary public employment
programmes (relief work), incorporating the Beveridge curve in a one-sector Nash
wage-bargaining model. They analysed both a direct job placement e¤ect and an
e¤ect on wage pressure, and concluded that the net e¤ect on equilibrium unem-
ployment depends on how programmes are targeted. Calmfors and Lang (1995)
analysed the e¤ects of ALMPs using a standard bargaining (union) model. They
argued that ALMPs may raise wage pressure and thus reduce regular employment
in a one-sector framework. Calmfors (1995a) sketched the e¤ects of retraining
programmes in a two-sector framework adopting the Blanch‡ower-Oswald (1994)
notion of a non-linear wage curve. He pointed out that ALMPs encompassing
both employed and unemployed workers may be a better policy than ALMPs
targeted only on unemployed workers.
This paper uses a two-sector general equilibrium model. I rely on the idea
that wages and employment are determined by the intersection of an employment
schedule and a wage-setting schedule (Layard & Nickell, 1986; Johnson & Layard
1986; Layard et al., 1991). The Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) e¢ciency-wage model is
used to model wage setting. More exactly, I extend the one-sector framework
of Calmfors and Lang (1995) to a two-sector framework along the lines sketched
in Calmfors (1995a). I study the e¤ects of transferring labour through ALMPs
from a low-productivity, high-unemployment sector to a high-productivity, low-
unemployment sector. Section 2 sets the scene for the subsequent analysis by
focusing on a benchmark case where there is a one-shot transfer of labour that is
not built into the expectations that enter into the wage-setting process. Sections
3 and 4 discuss the general case where such expectations e¤ects occur. There, I
especially study the consequences of di¤erent ways of targeting ALMPs.
2. The benchmark case
2.1. The model
I consider an economy made up by two sectors: a high-productivity sector with
a low sectoral unemployment rate (sector 1) and a low-productivity sector with a
high sectoral unemployment rate (sector 2). There are two types of labour: skilled
labour in the high-productivity sector and unskilled labour in the low-productivity
3sector. A worker can …nd himself in one of the following four states: (1) employ-
ment in the high-productivity sector; (2) employment in the low-productivity
sector; (3) unemployment in the high-productivity sector; and (4) unemployment
in the low-productivity sector.
I shall assume that labour-market policies train unskilled workers and transfer
them from the low-productivity to the high-productivity sector. Otherwise, the
two sectors are entirely separated from each other. As a benchmark case, I …rst
investigate the e¤ects of a one-shot transfer of labour from the low-productivity
to the high-productivity sector through ALMPs. I label this a helicopter labour
transfer policy. I assume that skilled labour maintains its productivity perma-
nently.
The Shapiro-Stiglitz e¢ciency-wage model is used to model wage setting.
Firms in both sectors employ workers who decide whether or not to shirk. Some
of the shirking workers are discovered and …red. In addition, workers leave for
other reasons. Firms make up for layo¤s and quits by hiring new workers from
the unemployment pool. Thus, the cost to a worker of being …red is to lose the
job and go through at least one period of unemployment until he/she is hired by
another …rm. Because …rms set their wages to avoid shirking, wages are above
the market-clearing level. Therefore involuntary unemployment exists.
2.1.1. The stocks of workers in the labour market
There are M individuals in the exogenously given labour force in the economy. Ag-
gregate employment is N. I let Mi,Ni and Ui denote the labour force, employment
and unemployment, respectively, in sector i (i = 1;2). Measuring in terms of the
aggregate labour force, M, I have n1+n2 = n and n1+u1+n2+u2 = m1+m2 = 1,
where ni = Ni=M; n = N=M, ui = Ui=M and mi = Mi=M. I shall refer to ni and
ui as employment and unemployment in sector i, respectively.
It is convenient to introduce a parameter, h, to represent the helicopter labour
transfer policy. h is a measure of the relative size of the two sectors. I let m1 =
(1 + h)=2 and m2 = (1¡ h)=2; where ¡1 · h · 1. When h = 0, the labour force
in the two sectors is the same, i.e., half of labour force is skilled workers and the
other half is unskilled workers. When h = 1, all workers are skilled, and when
h = ¡1, all workers are unskilled. It follows that
h = m1 ¡ m2: (2.1)
I denote the sectoral employment rates (employment in sector i as a fraction of
4the labour force in the sector) n0
i, i.e., n0













2.1.2. The wage-setting schedules
An individual’s instantaneous utility function is Vi (c;e), where c is the income
and e is the e¤ort. e can take only two values, zero and e. e is zero if no e¤ort
is supplied on the job, i.e., for both shirking and unemployed workers. e is the
non-negative e¤ort level of non-shirking workers. The utility function is assumed
to be additively separable and workers to be risk neutral. The utility function
can then be written as Vi(c;e) = c ¡ e.
Let -
nj
i (t) and -
sj
i (t) denote the discounted values of being employed for non-
shirking workers and shirking workers, respectively, at time t in the jth …rm of










i(t) ¡ e + q-ui(t + 1) + (1 ¡ q)-
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i(t) + q-ui(t + 1) + (1¡ q)-
sj
i (t + 1)
i
; (2.5)
where q is the same exogenously given quit rate for non-shirking workers in both
sectors and q is the same exogenously given quit rate for shirkers in both sectors.
I assume that q > q, because shirkers, in addition to voluntary separations, face
the probability of being caught shirking, in which case they are …red.





[b + si-i(t + 1) + (1 ¡ si)-ui(t + 1)]; (2.6)
where b is the unemployment bene…t and si is the probability for an unemployed
worker in sector i to …nd a job.
Like Shapiro & Stiglitz I assume that …rms determine wages for all future
periods and that the economy …nds itself in a steady state. Hence I can drop
time subscripts and set -
nj
i (t) = -
nj




i (t) = -
sj
i (t + 1) = -
sj
i
5and -ui(t) = -ui(t + 1) = -ui. I also assume a symmetric equilibrium, so that
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i = -i, it can be derived from (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) that
wi = b +
Ã
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2.1.3. The employment schedules
There are F identical …rms in each sector. Each …rm has a decreasing-returns-





















> 0 and f00(N
j
i ) < 0. N
j
i is the number of workers in the jth
…rm in sector i and Ai represents the productivity in sector i. I shall assume that
the productivity is higher in sector 1 than in sector 2, i.e., that A1 > A2. Because
all …rms within each sector are identical, it follows that N1
i = N2
i = ¢ ¢ ¢ = N
j
i =
¢ ¢ ¢ = NF
i . Total employment in sector i is thus FN
j
i = niM and employment in
each …rm can be written N
j
i = niM=F.
I assume that the economy is a small open one, so that the prices of the
products are given in the world market. Moreover, I normalise the relative price
of the products to unity. A …rm in each sector chooses N
j













®¡1. Because all …rms within each sector are identical, wages and
employment are the same in each …rm within the sector. Taking (2.2) and (2.3)
into account, the relations between the sectoral wages and the sectoral employ-



















where Bi = ®AiF2¡®M®¡1 > 0: From (2.8) and (2.9), it follows that dwi=dn0
i < 0
and d2wi=dn02
i < 0: Equations (2.8) and (2.9) thus de…ne downward-sloping and
convex labour-demand curves in each sector in the sectoral employment rate-wage
plan. The labour-demand elasticity is constant and equal to 1=(1¡ ®).
62.1.4. The steady-state conditions
The various stocks and ‡ows of labour are summarised in Figure 1. Each period
qNi workers quit their present jobs in sector i (because wages are set so that no
workers shirk and hence no workers are …red). They cannot …nd a new job until
they have been job seekers for at least one period. In a steady state, all stocks
have to be constant. Therefore, the condition for a steady state is
qni = siui:








Taking (2.10) into account, the wage-setting schedules become






where C1 = b + (q + r)e=(q ¡ q) > 0 and C2 = qe=(q ¡ q) > 0. The relationship
between the wage and the sectoral employment rate is thus the same in both
sectors. Since dwi=dn0
i > 0 and d2wi=dn02
i > 0, it follows that the wage-setting
schedules are increasing and convex function of the sectoral employment rates.
The four core equations, (2.8), (2.9) and (2.11) (note that (2.11) represents
two equations), determine the four endogenous variables, w1, w2, n0
1 and n0
2. The
other endogenous variables, n1, n2 are derived by substituting the equilibrium
sectoral employment rates into (2.2) and (2.3). The exogenous variables are the
labour-market policy variable, h, the unemployment bene…t b, the productivity
parameters A1 and A2, the other ‘technical’ parameters e, q, q, r, ®; and the
‘scale’ variables F and M.
I can illustrate the general-equilibrium solution of the model by the intersec-
tion of wage-setting schedules and labour demand curves as in Figure 2. The
wage-setting schedules are given by (2.11). The negative sloped labour demand
curves are given by (2.8) and (2.9). In this diagram, the equilibrium for the
high-productivity sector is E1 and for the low-productivity sector E2.
2.1.5. Comparative statics
I start from an initial equilibrium, in which both the sectoral employment rate and
the wage are higher in the high-productivity sector than in the low-productivity
7sector, i.e., w1 > w2 and n0
1 > n0
2 (see Figure 2). I shall investigate the case
when labour is trained and transferred from the low-productivity to the high-
productivity sectorthrough ALMPs. The labour transfer from the low-productivity
to the high-productivity sector is represented by an increase in the parameter h.
The e¤ects on wages, sectoral employment rates and sectoral employ-


















































The terms in the numerators come from the shift of the employment schedules.
As can be seen from (2.11), the wage-setting schedules are not a¤ected by the
helicopter labour transfer policy. The policy a¤ects wages and the sectoral em-
ployment rates in the two sectors only through the employment schedules. A
transfer of labour through ALMPs shifts the employment schedule downwards in
the high-productivity sector (because a larger labour force in the sector means
that a given number of employed persons is associated with a lower sectoral em-
ployment rate) and upwards in the low-productivity sector. This is illustrated
in Figure 3. The equilibrium for the high-productivity sector moves from E1 to
E¤
1 and for the low-productivity sector from E2 to E¤
2. This ‘helicopter e¤ect’ re-
duces the wage and the sectoral employment rate in the high-productivity sector
and increases the wage and the sectoral employment rate in the low-productivity
sector. The wage reduction in the high-productivity sector means that employ-
ment will increase there. The wage increase in the low-productivity sector means
that employment will decrease there. More precisely, from (2.2), (2.3), (2.12) and





























































where B1 = [(1+ h)=2]
1¡® (n0
1)
1¡® [C1 + C2n0
1=(1¡ n0




1¡® [C1 + C2n0
2=(1 ¡ n0
2)].
The e¤ects on aggregate employment The e¤ect of a transfer of workers












































2, it holds that 0 < 1=n0
1 < 1=n0
2 and 0 < (1 ¡ n0
1)=n0







2, aggregate employment is increased by the helicopter labour
transfer policy. As long as the sectoral employment rate di¤erentials are reduced
by the policy, aggregate employment is increased by labour transfer from the
low-productivity sector to the high-productivity sector.
This positive e¤ect on aggregate employment comes from the characteristics of
the wage-setting and the labour demand schedules. Since the wage-setting sched-
ules are upwards-sloping and convex, a given shift of the labour-demand curve
gives a larger impact on the wage, the higher the initial wage. Because labour
demand is constant-elastic, a given percentage change of the wage has a greater
leverage on employment, the higher is initial employment. As a consequence, the
increase in employment in the high-productivity sector is larger than the decrease
in employment in the low-productivity sector.





2, the helicopter labour transfer policy cannot increase aggregate employ-
ment any more, i.e., dn=dh = 0. Moreover, if the policy continues to transfer
labour even after the sectoral employment rate is equalised, the sectoral employ-





9means that the policy decreases aggregate employment, i.e., dn=dh < 0. There-
fore, aggregate employment is maximised when the helicopter labour transfer









2 can be derived from (2.16) as,
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Not very surprisingly, the “optimal” amount of labour that should be transferred
from the low-productivity to the high-productivity sector, i.e., m1 ¡m2, depends
positively on the productivity ratio A1=A2. The more productive is sector 1 rel-
ative to sector 2, the larger are the bene…ts in terms of employment of using
ALMPs to upgrade the skills of the unskilled workers.
3. Standard ALMPs
In the benchmark case, I analysed the e¤ects of a one-shot transfer of labour.
No account was taken of the fact that the prospect of such a transfer of labour
might be built into the expectations in‡uencing wage setting. However, this must
be the case if ALMPs are used to generate a continuous ‡ow of labour from the
low-productivity to the high-productivity sector.
As Calmfors & Lang (1995) and Calmfors (1995a) have pointed out, ALMPs
may reduce regular employment because of an accommodation e¤ect. The rational
expectation that there is a certain probability that an unemployed worker may be
placed in a labour-market programme, giving higher utility than open unemploy-
ment, may raise wages. I shall investigate the possibility of such an e¤ect in my
model by looking at a case when only unemployed workers in the low-productivity
sector are trained and transferred to the high-productivity sector, where both the
wage and the sectoral employment rate are higher. This case corresponds to the
standard type of active labour-market policy practiced in, for example, Sweden.
As a contrast, I shall also analyse ALMPs that instead target employed insiders
in the low-productivity sector and transfer them to the high-productivity sector.
This type of labour-market policy can be thought of as a general growth-oriented
policy trying to raise the general competence level of the labour force.
103.1. The wage-setting schedules
I still postulate a stationary labour force. But I now assume that individuals leave
the labour force at a rate a and that new individuals enter the labour force at the
same rate. I normalise the value of death to zero. The discounted values of being









i(t) ¡ e + q-ui(t + 1) + (1 ¡ a ¡ q)-
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i(t) + q-ui(t + 1) + (1 ¡ a ¡ q)-
sj
i (t + 1)
i
: (3.2)
As before, since wages are set so as to avoid shirking and I assume a steady state, I
can set -
nj
i (t) = -
nj
i (t + 1) = -
sj
i (t) = -
sj
i (t + 1) = -i and -ui(t) = -ui(t+1) =
-ui.
An unemployed individual in sector i can …nd a regular job in the same sector
with the endogenously determined probability si. For a job seeker in the low-
productivity sector, there also exists the probability of being placed in ALMPs,
in which case he/she is transferred to the high-productivity sector and becomes a
job seeker there in the next period. I denote this exogenous probability xu. The
transformation of unskilled into skilled workers in ALMPs is assumed to occur
instantaneously. This way I need not care about any instantaneous utility e¤ects
from being in an ALMP. This will a¤ect welfare only by changing the future
prospects of participants in the labour market. The probability that a job seeker
in the high-productivity sector remains a job seeker in this sector also in the next
period is 1 ¡ a ¡ s1. The probability that a job seeker in the low-productivity
sector is also a job seeker in this sector in the next period is 1 ¡ a ¡ s2 ¡ xu:









[b + s2-2 + xu-u1 + (1¡ a ¡ s2 ¡ xu)-u2]: (3.4)
Because the participants in ALMPs are instantaneously transferred to sector 1,
-u1 is also the expected present value of participation in an ALMP. I assume
that the expected present value of participation in an ALMP is greater than or
equal to the expected present value of being unemployed in the low-productivity
sector, i.e., -u1 ¸ -u2. This is an incentive compatibility constraint. From (3.1)
11- (3.4) and the assumption of a steady state, I can derive that -u1 ¡ -u2 =
[(s1 ¡ s2)=(a + r + xu)][e=(q ¡ q)]. Thus the incentive compatibility constraint
can be shown to be equivalent to the condition that s1 ¸ s2
1.
Proceeding in the same wayas in the benchmark case, I can derive the following
two wage equations in this case:
w1 = b +
Ã
1 +




w2 = b +
Ã
1 +




xu (s1 ¡ s2)






Comparing (3.5) with (2.7), it is clear that the wage-setting schedule in the high-
productivity sector is basically the same as in the benchmark case. On the other
hand, (3.6) shows that the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector
includes a term corresponding to the benchmark case and a term arising because
of the chance of being placed in an ALMP. The second term captures the bene…t
of being moved to the high-productivity sector. This term tends to increase the
wage in the low-productivity sector when the incentive compatibility constraint
is satis…ed, i.e., when s1 ¸ s2. The reason is that ALMPs reduce the welfare loss
of being unemployed in the low-productivity sector.
3.2. The steady-state conditions
The model is summarised in Figure 4, which shows the various stocks and ‡ows
in the labour market. The new entrants, a, have to pass through the pool of job
seekers before they can …nd a job. A fraction xa of them is assumed to enter the
labour force with high skills and go into the high-productivity sector. A fraction
1¡xa is assumed to enter with low skills and ‡ow into the low-productivity sector.
Each period, individuals leave the labour force at a rate a. The share of the total
labour force passing through ALMPs in each period is l. Participants consist of
unemployed workers from the low-productivity sector. Since all stocks have to be
constant in a steady state, the conditions for a steady state are
(a + q)ni = siui; (3.7)
1The above incentive compatibility constraint needs to be ful…lled only if participation in
the training programme is voluntary and unemployed workers would continue to receive their
unemployment bene…ts also if they turn down the o¤er to participate. In the case of Sweden,
refusal to participate in an ALMP would mean a loss of the bene…t entitlement. In that case,
the incentive compatibility constraint becomes much weaker.
12l = xuu2; (3.8)
(a + s1)u1 = l + qn1 + xaa; (3.9)
(a + s2 + xu)u2 = qn2 + (1¡ xa)a: (3.10)
Equation (3.7) is the condition for constant employment in sector i. The LHS
of (3.7) is the out‡ow from employment and the RHS of (3.7) is the in‡ow into
employment. Equation (3.8) gives the participation in ALMPs (the number of
unemployed worker selected from the low-productivity sector). Equations (3.9)
and (3.10) are the conditions for constant unemployment in the high-productivity
and the low-productivity sector, respectively. The LHS of (3.9) and (3.10) are
out‡ows from unemployment and the RHS of these equations are the in‡ows into
unemployment in the respective sectors.
From (2.2), (2.3) and (3.7), the probabilities to get a job in the two sectors
are






Next, from (2.1), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), h satis…es
h =
¡2xun2 + xu + a(2xa ¡ 1)
(a + xu)
: (3.12)
Bysubstituting (3.11) into (3.5), the wage-setting schedule in the high-productivity
sector becomes






where C3 = b + (a + q + r)e=(q ¡ q) > 0 and C4 = (a + q)e=(q ¡ q) > 0.

















3 > 0: (3.14)
Hence, the wage-setting schedule in the high-productivity sector is upwards-
sloping and convex.
Bysubstituting (3.11) into (3.6), the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity
sector can be written as
w2 = w2B + Pu; (3.15)
where w2B = C3 + C4n0
2=(1 ¡ n0





=(a + r + xu). The wage in the low-productivity sector is equal to a term corre-
sponding to the benchmark case (w2B) and a term arising because of the chance
13of being placed in an ALMP (Pu). Pu re‡ects the value of being moved to the
high-productivity sector. It can easily be seen that Pu ¸ 0 if the sectoral em-
ployment rate in the high-productivity sector is greater than or equal to that in
the low-productivity sector, i.e., if n0
1 ¸ n0
2 as I assume. The reason is that the
chance of getting a job is then greater in the high-productivity sector than in the
low-productivity sector, which tends to create a wage di¤erential.
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Hence the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector is also upwards-
sloping and convex.
From (3.13), (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16), I can draw the wage-setting curves as
in Figure 5. It can be seen that w1 = w2 when n0
1 = n0
2, but that the slope
of the wage-setting curve is steeper in the high-productivity sector than in the
low-productivity sector.
The four core equations, (2.8), (2.9), (3.13) and (3.15), determine the four
endogenous variables, w1, w2, n0
1 and n0
2. The other endogenous variables, n1, n2
are derived by substituting the equilibrium sectoral employment rates into (2.2)
and (2.3). The exogenous variables are the labour-market policy variable, xu,
the unemployment bene…t b, the productivity parameters A1 and A2, the other
‘technical’ parameters a, e, q, q, r, xa, ® and the ‘scale’ variables F and M.
3.3. Comparative statics
In this section, I investigate the e¤ects of a change in the probability to participate
in ALMPs. I start from an initial equilibrium as before, in which both the sectoral
employment rate and the wage are higher in the high-productivity sector than
in the low-productivity sector. This is equivalent to assuming that the chance of
getting a job is greater in the high-productivity sector than in the low-productivity
sector, i.e., that s1 > s2. The change in ALMPs is represented by a change in xu.
143.3.1. The e¤ects on wages, the sectoral employment rate and sectoral
employment



































































(s1 ¡ s2)(a + r)





















































































where B1 = [(1+ h)=2]
1¡® (n0
1)
1¡® [C3 + C4n0
1=(1¡ n0




1¡® [C3 + C4n0
2=(1 ¡ n0
2) + Pu].
The e¤ect on the measure of the relative size of the two sectors (h) is derived
























































































Equation (3.23) shows that an increase in xu increases the skilled labour force
and decreases the unskilled labour force. Equations (3.17) and (3.23) show that
the sectoral employment rate in the high-productivity sector is decreased by the
policy. Hence the wage is reduced in this sector. Equations (3.21) and (3.23)
show that there is a positive e¤ect of an increase in xu on employment in the
high-productivity sector. This is because of the same helicopter e¤ect as in the
benchmark case (see Figure 6).
I turn now to the e¤ects on the wage, the sectoral employment rate and em-
ployment in the low-productivity sector. Equation (3.18) shows the e¤ect on the
sectoral employment rate in the low-productivity sector. The …rst term in the nu-
merator comes from the shift of the employment schedule in the low-productivity
sector. An expansion of ALMPs shifts the employment schedule upwards. This is
the same helicopter e¤ect as in the benchmark case, which tends to increase the
wage and the sectoral employment rate in the low-productivity sector (see Figure
6). Employment in this sector tends to fall by the helicopter e¤ect.
The second term, i.e., @Pu=@xu, and the third term, i.e., (@Pu=@n0
1)(@n0
1=@xu),
in the numerator come from the shift of the wage-setting schedule in the low-
productivity sector. The second term is a direct e¤ect of ALMPs. The welfare
loss from being unemployed in the low-productivity sector is reduced because
the probability of moving to the high-productivity sector, where the chance of
getting a job is greater than in the low-productivity sector, is increased. This is
an accommodation e¤ect, which tends to raise the wage and reduce employment in
the low-productivity sector. This accommodation e¤ect tends to shift the wage-
setting schedule in the low-productivity sector upwards.
The third term is an indirect e¤ect of ALMPs via the sectoral employment
rate in the high-productivity sector. Taking (3.17) and (3.23) into account, this
term tends to increase the sectoral employment and reduce the wage in the low-
productivity sector. For an individual worker that is transferred, the chance to
get a job in the high-productivity sector becomes smaller, i.e., @n0
1=@xu < 0.
16This means that labour-market tightness in the high-productivity sector becomes
relatively smaller. This reduces the bene…t of being transferred to the high-
productivity sector and thus increases the welfare loss for a worker of being …red.
This gives employers in the low-productivity sector an incentive to reduce the
wage. I shall label this a wage-reducing relative labour-market tightness e¤ect. It
tends to shift the wage-setting schedule downwards in the low-productivity sector.
The helicopter e¤ect, the accommodation e¤ect and the relative labour-market
tightness e¤ect thus work in di¤erent directions. The net impact on the sectoral
employment rate in the low-productivity sector depends on the relative magnitude
of these three e¤ects.
The e¤ect on employment in the low-productivity sector can be seen from
(3.22). From the same reason as the e¤ect on the sectoral employment rate, the
net e¤ect on employment in this sector is also in general ambiguous. But in
an initial equilibrium, where there are no ALMPs, i.e., when xu = 0, it follows
from (3.20) that the relative labour-tightness e¤ect is zero. The incentive for un-
skilled workers to shirk is una¤ected by the worsened labour market conditions for
skilled workers. Hence, the wage-setting schedule must in this case shift upwards
due to the accommodation e¤ect. Employment must then decrease in the low-
productivity sector. The reason is that both the wage-setting schedule and the
labour-demand curve in Figure 6 are shifted upwards. Both e¤ects tends to raise
the wage in the low-productivity sector and thus to reduce sectoral employment.
3.3.2. The e¤ects on aggregate employment















































































































The …rst term represents the helicopter e¤ect. If the sectoral employment rate is
higher in the high-productivity sector than in the low-productivity sector, i.e., if
n0
1 > n0
2; the helicopter e¤ect tends to increase aggregate employment. The second
term represents the accommodation e¤ect and the third term the relative labour-
market tightness e¤ect. The accommodation e¤ect tends to decrease aggregate
employment and the relative labour-tightness e¤ect tends to increase it. Because
the net e¤ect on aggregate employment depends on the relative magnitude of
these three e¤ects, the net e¤ect is in general ambiguous.
In an initial equilibrium, where there are no ALMPs, i.e., when xu = 0, the
relative-tightness e¤ect is zero. The net e¤ect on aggregate employment then
depends on the relative magnitude of the helicopter e¤ect and the accommodation
e¤ect. When n0
1 = n0
2, which implies that s1 = s2, the helicopter e¤ect in this
case is still positive. Because the wage-setting schedule is ‡atter in the low-
productivity sector than in the high-productivity sector, the decrease of the wage
in the high-productivity sector is larger than the increase in the wage in the low-
productivity sector when the employment schedules shift. Hence, the helicopter
e¤ect tends to increase aggregate employment even if the sectoral employment
rates are equalised. The accommodation e¤ect is zero, because s1 = s2 implies
that there is no gain of being transferred to the high-productivity sector. The
relative labour-market tightness e¤ect is positive. An increase of the probability
to participate in ALMPs must thus at this point increase aggregate employment
i.e., dn=dxu > 0.
4. ALMPs targeted on insiders
Calmfors (1995a, 1996) has pointed out that ALMPs that are targeted on in-
siders could be more promising in terms of decreasing aggregate unemployment
than ALMPs targeted on outsiders. The reason is that ALMPs targeted on in-
siders have no accommodation e¤ect that tends to decrease employment in the
low-productivity sector. On the contrary, such ALMPs increase the value of em-
ployment and ought hence to promote wage restraint.
Going outside the model, it is also conceivable that a general growth-oriented
policy would focus on training insiders rather than outsiders, because it may be
18believed that this is more e¤ective. Employed workers may have been hired origi-
nally because it was judged that on-the-job training would raise their productivity
more than would be the case for other job candidates. One can think of ALMPs
that are targeted on insiders as a policy designed to increase competence in general
in the economy.
In the following section, I shall investigate this possibility in my model by
looking at a case where only employed workers in the low-productivity sector are
transferred to the high-productivity sector.
4.1. The wage-setting schedules
I thus now assume that only employed workers in the low-productivity sector are
admitted into ALMPs. A fraction xn of unskilled employed workers is immediately
placed in ALMPs. The present values of employment for non-shirking and shirking
workers, respectively, in the high-productivity sector are the same as in the case
with targeting on the unemployed, i.e., (3.1) and (3.2). The present values of









2(t) ¡ e + xn-u1(t + 1) + q-u2(t + 1)
+(1 ¡ a ¡ q ¡ xn)-
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2(t) + xn-u1(t + 1) + q-u2(t + 1)
+(1 ¡ a ¡ q ¡ xn)-
sj
2 (t + 1)
i
: (4.2)
As before, the transformation of unskilled into skilled workers in ALMPs occurs
instantaneously. Therefore -u1(t) is the expected present value of participation
in ALMPs at time t. As assumed before, wages are set so as to avoid shirking and
the economy is in a steady state. Thus I can set -
nj
i (t) = -
nj





i (t + 1) = -i and -ui(t) = -ui(t + 1) = -ui.
An unemployed individual in sector i can …nd a regular job in the same sector
with the endogenously determined probability si. Hence the probability that a
job seeker in sector i remains a job seeker in this sector also in the next period is




[b + si-i + (1 ¡ a ¡ si)-ui]: (4.3)
I again impose an incentive compatibility constraint. If employed worker in the
low-productivity sector are to participate in training programmes it must hold that
19the expected present value of participation in an ALMP is greater than or equal
to the expected present value of being employed in the low-productivity sector,
i.e., -u1 ¸ -2. From (3.1), (3.2), (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) and the assumption of a
steady state, I can derive that -u1 ¡-2 = [(s1 ¡ a ¡ r ¡ s2)=(a + r)][e=(q ¡ q)].
Thus the incentive compatibility constraint can be shown to be equivalent to the
condition that s1 ¸ a + r + s2. It is not enough that s1 ¸ s2, but s1 must be
su¢ciently larger. So this is a stricter condition than n1 ¸ n2. The explanation
is that employers when setting wages have to compare the value for a worker of
being employed in the low-productivity sector and the value of being unemployed
(after having completed an ALMP) in the high-productivity sector. Therefore,
the chance for an unemployed to get a job in the high-productivity sector must
be “much” larger than the chance for an unemployed to get a job in the low-
productivity sector (as there is only a certain probability each period that an
employed worker will turn into an unemployed job seeker), if there is to be a gain
for an employed worker in the low-productivity sector to be transferred to the
high-productivity sector.
I use (3.1), (3.2), (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) to derive wage equations in the same
way as before. The wage-setting schedule in the high-productivity sector turns
out the same as (3.13). The wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector
is
w2 = b +
Ã
1 +











Similar to (3.15), the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector is equal
to a term corresponding to the benchmark case and a term re‡ecting the value
of being moved to the high-productivity sector through ALMPs. The latter term
tends to reduce the wage. The reason is that the chance of being placed in an
ALMP when employed represents in this case an extra reward from not shirking.
This means that there is less need for the employer to set a high wage to create
an incentive not to shirk.
4.2. The steady-state conditions
The model is summarised in Figure 7. Participants in ALMPs now consist of
unskilled employed workers. The steady-state conditions are
(a + q)n1 = s1u1; (4.5)
(a + q + xn)n2 = s2u2; (4.6)
20l = xnn2; (4.7)
(a + s1)u1 = l + qn1 + xaa; (4.8)
(a + s2)u2 = qn2 + (1 ¡ xa)a: (4.9)
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are the conditions for constant employment in the high-
productivity sector and in the low-productivity sector, respectively. The LHS in
both equations are the out‡ows from employment and the RHS are the in‡ows
into employment. The term xnn2 in (4.6) and (4.7) gives participation in ALMPs.
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) are the conditions for constant unemployment in the
high-productivity sector and in the low-productivity sector, respectively. The
LHS in (4.8) and (4.9) are out‡ows from unemployment and the RHS of these
equations are in‡ows into unemployment.
From (2.2), (2.3), (4.5) and (4.6) the probabilities to get a job in the two
sectors are












From (2.1), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9), h satis…es
h =
2xnn2 + a(2xa ¡ 1)
a
: (4.12)
As I discussed insection 4.1., the wage-setting schedule in the high-productivity
is the same as when ALMPs were targeted on the unemployed. It is thus upwards-
sloping and convex. By substituting (4.10) and (4.11) into (4.8), the wage-setting
schedule in the low-productivity sector is
w2 = w2B + Pn; (4.13)
where w2B = C3 + C4n0
2(1 ¡ n0
2) and Pn = xn [(a + r ¡ (a + q) n0
1=(1¡ n0
1) ¡
(a + q + xn)n0
2=(1 ¡ n0
2))=(a + r)][e=(q ¡ q)]. The term w2B is a term corre-
sponding to the benchmark case and the term Pn re‡ects the value of being placed
in ALMPs.
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21Hence, the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector is also upwards-
sloping and convex.
From (3.13), (3.14), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), I can draw the wage-setting
curves as in Figure 8. It can be seen that w1 = w2 when n0
1 = n0
2, but that the
slope of the wage-setting curve is steeper in the low-productivity sector than in
the high-productivity sector.
The four core equations, (2.8), (2.9), (3.13) and (4.13), determine the four
endogenous variables, w1, w2, n0
1 and n0
2. The other endogenous variables, n1, n2
are derived by substituting the equilibrium sectoral employment rates into (2.2)
and (2.3).
4.3. Comparative statics
I now examine the e¤ect of a change in the chance of being placed in ALMPs for
an employed worker, i.e., a change in xn.
4.3.1. The e¤ects on wages, the sectoral employment rate and sectoral
employment








































































































































































where B1 = [(1+ h)=2]
1¡® (n0
1)
1¡® [C3 + C4n0
1=(1¡ n0




1¡® [C3 + C4n0
2=(1 ¡ n0
2) + Pn].
The e¤ect on the relative size of the two sectors, h; is derived from (4.12),
















































































































Equation (4.22) shows that an increase in xn increases the skilled labour force
and decreases the unskilled labour force. As can be seen from (4.16) and (4.22),
the sectoral employment rate is decreased and thus the wage reduced in the high-
productivity sector by the policy. Hence, there is a positive e¤ect on employment
in the high-productivity sector, as shown by (4.20) and (4.22). This is the same
helicopter e¤ect as before.
The impact on the sectoral employment rate in the low-productivity sector
can be seen from (4.17). The …rst term in the numerator comes from the upwards
23shift of the employment schedule in the low-productivity sector by an expansion
of ALMPs. This is the same helicopter e¤ect as before. It tends to increases the
wage and the sectoral employment rate in the low-productivity sector (see Figure
9). Employment in this sector thus tends to fall by this e¤ect.
The second term, i.e., @Pn=@xn, and the third term, i.e., (@Pn=@n0
1)(@n0
1=@xn),
in the numerator come from the shift of the wage-setting schedule. The second
term is a direct e¤ect of ALMPs. It tends to shift the wage-setting schedule
downwards. The wage in the low-productivity sector tends to fall, because workers
there have a stronger incentive not to shirk in order to stay employed if this gives
them a chance to move to the high-productivity sector. I shall label this e¤ect a
promotion-wish e¤ect.
The third term is an indirect e¤ect of ALMPs via the sectoral employment
rate in the high-productivity sector. As can be seen from (4.16), an increase in
the probability to participate in ALMPs decreases the sectoral employment rate
in the high-productivity sector. This means a reduction in the probability to
get a job in the high-productivity sector and weakens the incentive for employed
workers in the low-productivity sector not to shirk in order to preserve the chance
of being transferred. As a result, employers raise the wage in the low-productivity
sector. ALMPs targeted on employed workers in the low-productivity sector thus
has a wage-raising relative labour-market tightness e¤ect.
The helicopter e¤ect, the promotion-wish e¤ect and the wage-raising relative
labour-market tightness e¤ect thus work in di¤erent directions. The net e¤ect on
the wage-setting schedule in the low-productivity sector is in general ambiguous.
But in an initial equilibrium, where there are no ALMPs, i.e., when xn = 0, it
follows from (4.19) that the relative labour-tightness e¤ect is zero. The wage-
setting schedule must in this case shift downwards due to the promotion-wish
e¤ect. Since the helicopter e¤ect tends to increase the sectoral employment rate
in the low-productivity sector, the initial impact of introducing ALMPs on the
sectoral employment rate in this sector is positive.
The e¤ect on employment in the low-productivity sector can be seen from
(4.21). From the same reason as the e¤ect on the sectoral employment rate, the
net e¤ect on employment in this sector is also in general ambiguous.
244.3.2. The e¤ects on aggregate employment

















































































































The …rst term represents the helicopter e¤ect on aggregate employment. The
helicopter e¤ect in the earlier cases increased aggregate employment when n0
1 > n0
2.
However, this assumption is not su¢cient in this case for the helicopter e¤ect to
increase employment. If the wage-setting schedule is much steeper in the low-
productivity than in the high-productivity sector, i.e., if xn is very large, the
reduction of employment in the low-productivity sector is larger than the increase
of employment in the high-productivity sector.
The second term is the promotion-wish e¤ect, which tends to increase aggre-
gate employment. The third term is the relative labour-market tightness e¤ect,
which tends to decrease aggregate employment. Since these three e¤ects work
in di¤erent directions, the net e¤ect of ALMPs on aggregate employment is in
general unclear.
In an initial equilibrium, where there are no ALMPs, i.e., when xn = 0, the
helicopter e¤ect tends to increase aggregate employment since Pn is zero. The
promotion-wish e¤ect also tends to increase aggregate employment. The relative
labour-market tightness e¤ect which tends to decrease aggregate employment is
zero. Thus ALMPs targeted on the employed initially increase aggregate employ-
ment.
255. Concluding remarks
Active labour market policies involving a one-shot transfer of labour from a low-
productivity, high unemployment sector to a high-productivity, low unemploy-
ment sector is analysed as a benchmark case. This policy has a direct labour
transfer e¤ect, a helicopter e¤ect, which tends to increase employment in the high-
productivity sector and to decrease employment in the low-productivity sector.
But the net e¤ect of the one-shot labour transfer policy on aggregate employ-
ment is positive. This positive e¤ect on aggregate employment comes from the
characteristics of the wage-setting and the labour-demand schedules. Because the
wage-setting schedules are convex and the labour demand schedules are constant-
elastic, the increase in employment in the high-productivity sector is greater than
the decrease in employment in the low-productivity sector.
However the analysis of a one-shot labour transfer policy does not tell how a
labour market policy continuously transferring labour between sectors will work,
because such a policy is bound to a¤ect wage-setting via expectations. Therefore,
I analyse continuous labour transfer policies through ALMPs as a general case.
The expectation to be transferred through ALMPs a¤ects the expected utility of
labour in the low-productivity sector and thus in‡uences the wage in the sector.
These e¤ects either o¤set or reinforce the direct labour-transfer e¤ect in terms of
aggregate employment depending on how ALMPs are targeted. I analyse both
ALMPs targeted on outsiders and ALMPs targeted on insiders.
When ALMPs are targeted on outsiders, they will a¤ect wage-setting in two
ways. First, there is an accommodation e¤ect that tends to raise the wage and
reduce employment in the low-productivity sector. The reason is that the welfare
loss from being unemployed in the low-productivity sector is reduced, because
the probability of moving to the high-productivity sector is increased by ALMPs.
But there is also a wage-reducing relative labour-market tightness e¤ect, which
tends to reduce the wage and increase employment in the low-productivity sector.
This is because the transfer of labour tends to increase the competition for jobs
in the high-productivity sector (reduce labour-market tightness) and thus make
it less attractive for an individual worker to be moved there. This reduces the
incentive to set a high wage in the low-productivity sector. In an initial equilib-
rium, where there are no ALMPs, the incentive for unskilled workers to shirk is
una¤ected by the worsened labour market conditions for skilled workers. Since
both the helicopter e¤ect and the accommodation e¤ect raise the wage in the
low-productivity sector, employment initially decreases there when ALMPs are
26introduced. The net e¤ect on aggregate employment is in general ambiguous
because the helicopter e¤ect, the accommodation e¤ect and the wage-reducing
relative labour-market tightness e¤ect work in di¤erent directions.
ALMPs targeted on insiders also have two di¤erent e¤ects on the wage in the
low-productivity sector. On the one hand, there is a promotion-wish e¤ect which
tends to decrease the wage and to increase employment in the low-productivity
sector. This is because employed workers in the low-productivity sector have a
stronger incentive not to shirk in order to stay employed if this gives them a chance
to move to the high-productivity sector. This tends to reduce wages in the low-
productivity sector. On the other hand, there is a wage-raising relative labour-
market tightness e¤ect which tends to raise the wage and reduce employment
in the low-productivity sector. The reason is that the reduction of the relative
labour-market tightness in the high-productivity sector by ALMPs weakens the
incentive for employed workers in the low-productivity sector not to shirk in order
to preserve the chance of being moved to the high-productivity sector. As a
result, employers raise the wage in the low-productivity sector. Together with
the helicopter e¤ect, the net e¤ect on aggregate employment is also in general
ambiguous. But in an initial equilibrium, where there are no ALMPs, both the
helicopter e¤ect and the promotion-wish e¤ect tend to raise the wage and the
relative labour-market tightness e¤ect is zero. Therefore, aggregate employment
is increased by introducing ALMPs targeted on insiders.
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